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A B S T R A C T
Recent advances in the maritime industry include research and development of new sophisticated ships with a
number of smart functionalities and enhanced autonomy. The new functions and autonomy levels though come
at the cost of increased connectivity. This results in increased ship vulnerability to cyber-attacks, which may lead
to financial loss, environmental pollution, safety accidents. The aim of this study is to propose a novel method for
cybersecurity risk assessment of ship systems. In this novel method, the Cyber-Preliminary Hazard Analysis
method steps are enriched with new steps supporting the identification of cyber-attack scenarios and the risk
assessment implementation. The proposed method is applied for the cyber-risk assessment and design en-
hancement of the navigation and propulsion systems of an inland waterways autonomous vessel. The results
demonstrate that several critical scenarios can arise on the investigated autonomous vessel due to known vul-
nerabilities. These can be sufficiently controlled by introducing appropriate modifications to the systems design.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) represent a class of systems con-
sisting of software and hardware components, which are used to control
physical processes (Gunes et al., 2014). CPSs have been advancing in a
number of application areas, including the maritime industry (DNV GL,
2015). CPSs are expected to increase the productivity and safety levels
by removing, substituting and/or supporting the operator in the deci-
sion-making process, thus reducing the number of human errors leading
to accidents. Typical examples of the existing marine CPSs include the
Diesel-Electric Propulsion plant, the Safety Monitoring and Control
System, the Dynamic Positioning System as well as the Heating, Ven-
tilation & Air Conditioning systems (DNV GL, 2015). The number of the
CPSs is expected to increase in autonomous ships, which are considered
to be the ultimate marine CPS.
The maritime industry has demonstrated a strong interest in the
development of the next generation ships such as smart ships or au-
tonomous ships, employing CPSs. Examples of relevant projects include
the autonomous Yara Birkenland ship design and construction (Yara,
2018), as well as the MUNIN (MUNIN, 2016), AAWA (AAWA, 2016),
SISU and SVAN (Daffey, 2018) projects. The most recent initiative is the
AUTOSHIP project (AUTOSHIP, 2019), which aims at converting a
short sea going vessel (as a demonstrator) and an inland waterways
vessel (as a demonstrator too) into autonomous vessels, thus pushing
the available technology and autonomy levels further on larger size
vessels.
The introduction of CPSs is accompanied by an increased com-
plexity attributed to the heterogeneous character of the installed CPSs,
the dependence on information exchanging with other systems, the
additional new interactions with humans, the increased number of
controllers running complex software and the increased inter-
connectivity required for implementing the desired CPSs’ functional-
ities (Bolbot et al., 2019c). All these parameters, especially the latter,
introduce new hazards, as cyber-attacks can exploit vulnerabilities in
the communication links and directly affect the integrity or availability
of the data and control systems, leading to accidents (Bolbot et al.,
2019c; Eloranta and Whitehead, 2016).
A number of incidents have been reported with unauthorised people
gaining access to various conventional ship control systems. In one
case, the Electronic Chart Display Information System (ECDIS) was
infected, resulting in a disruption of the ship operation with significant
financial consequences (BIMCO, 2018a). In another attack, the ECDIS
updates constituted a bridge for implementing the attack on a radar
system allowing the attacker to manipulate the radar measurements
displayed on screen (Wingrove, 2017). In another case, a malware was
installed through a USB memory stick on a power management system,
degrading its performance (BIMCO, 2018a). Satellite communication
systems of another ship were also compromised by white hackers via a
tracking system due to weak passwords (Doyle, 2017; Munro, 2017).
Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing attacks were reported in the
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Black sea during a military exercise, where the ships suddenly were
“found” over 32 km inland (Newman, 2019). Even unknown outdated
systems were found installed on ships, which constitute a potential
entry point to the ship control systems (Rider, 2020). These incidents
are indicative as there are numerous reported cases of cyber-attacks in
shipping operations e.g. (BIMCO, 2018a; Bradbury, 2019; Marine
Electronics and Communications, 2017; Santamarta, 2015; U.S. Coast
Guard, 2019).
Important lessons can be learnt from these incidents, such as, which
ships systems, how they can be compromised, and what might be the
potential consequences. However, due to the novelty of this issue and
underreporting, there are no reliable statistics with respect to the fre-
quency of cyber-attacks (Tam and Jones, 2019). There exist some
generic statistics available or questionnaire results, which can provide
only indicative information (BIMCO, 2018b). In addition, some mal-
ware can remain dormant in a ship for prolonged time, which impedes
the obtaining of accurate data (BIMCO, 2018a). Furthermore, the sys-
tems have constantly been evolving (Bolbot et al., 2019c), new vul-
nerabilities have been found and new attack types have been devel-
oped, which incommode the identification and prediction of potential
attack scenarios based on the available accidents and incidents data.
Considering the recent developments, it is expected that ships and
especially autonomous ships will attract more attention from different
hacker groups and the number of these incidents will increase.
Therefore, there is a need to ensure that these attack scenarios are
identified and properly addressed.
The ships can be viewed as complex industrial and transport sys-
tems, where Information Technology (IT) is strongly intertwined with
Operational Technology (OT) (BIMCO, 2018a; International Maritime
Organisation (IMO), 2017). It is important therefore to consider not
only the financial but also the safety and environmental impact of
successful cyber-attacks (BIMCO, 2018a; BV, 2018). However, different
attack types can be applied to different components, might have dif-
ferent consequences and also different control barriers (Flaus, 2019).
The classical hazard identification and analysis methods, properly
modified, can support the identification of inadvertent attack scenarios
and their control measures in systems (Flaus, 2019; Kriaa et al., 2015).
Nevertheless, due to the scarcity of the available data mentioned pre-
viously, it is necessary to support the scenarios ranking process to allow
for a cost-efficient designenhancement. In this respect, the likelihood
and the attack scenarios will be affected by the specific attack group
goal (Tam and Jones, 2019), which can be used to support the identi-
fication and ranking of these scenarios. As it is referred to the marine
systems, it is also essential to ensure that these systems risk is in ac-
cordance with acceptable maritime criteria. As the whole context has
constantly been evolving (Bolbot et al., 2019c), it is crucial to ensure
that the method allows for the easy reassessment of scenarios when new
vulnerabilities are identified or new systems are installed.
Summarising the above, it is important to: (a) consider in more
detail the potential types and consequences of cyber-attacks on ship
systems; (b) incorporate the different attack groups interests and ac-
tivity levels; (c) facilitate and guide the ranking process; (d) be aligned
with the existing processes in the maritime industry; (e) guide the
system design enhancement.
1.2. Literature review
A number of standards are available for systems cybersecurity as-
sessment and assurance, including ISO 27000 series standards (ISO/
IEC, 2016), NIST SP 800 series standards (NIST, 2019), IEC 62433
series standards (IEC, 2018) and specific standards in automotive and
aerospace industries (Flaus, 2019). As there is an increasing number of
concerns with respect to the ship systems vulnerability to cyber-attacks
in the maritime industry, a number of guidelines have been developed
to address potential threats (ABS, 2018; BIMCO, 2018a; Boyes and
Isbell, 2017; BV, 2018; ClassNK, 2019; DNV GL, 2016, 2019; IMO,
2016a, 2017; LR, 2019; Maritime affairs directorate of France, 2016;
United States Coast Guard, 2015).
In addition, a number of previous research studies focused on the
high-level cyber security assessment of the ship control systems and
ship networks in autonomous ships. Jones et al. (2016) provided an
overview of different attack scenarios for a typical cargo ship. Tam and
Jones (2019) proposed a model-based approach for the risk assessment
of cyber-threats named MaCRA (Maritime Cyber-Risk Assessment) by
considering the technological systems vulnerabilities as well as the
ease-of-exploiting and the potential hackers rewards. Using the same
model-based approach, Tam and Jones (2018) implemented a risk as-
sessment for a number of vessels including Yara Birkenland, Rolls Royce
AAWA ocean-going reduced crew vessel and Mayflower autonomous
ship. Kavallieratos et al. (2019) employed the STRIDE (Spoofing,
Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service and
Elevation of Privilege) method to assess risks in a generic autonomous
vessel.
Other approaches used more detailed methods for cyber-security
analysis. Omitola et al. (2018) analysed an unmanned surface vessel
navigation system using the System-Theoretic Process Analysis for
cyber-attacks (STPA-sec) targeting at modifying data that are provided
as input to the vessel navigation system. Shang et al. (2019) combined
attack trees with fuzzy ranking for assessing the likelihood of successful
cyberattacks on ship propulsion/power generation systems. Guzman
et al. (2019) suggested a new method, named uncontrolled flows of
information and energy, which uses diagrammatic dependencies within
CPSs for risk analysis of the collision avoidance function of an auton-
omous surface vessel. Svilicic et al. (2019a) proposed a risk assessment
framework, which is based on a combination of questionnaires, vul-
nerability scanning and penetration testing results. Glomsrud and Xie
(2019) suggested the use of the STPA with attack trees for the safety
assessment of autonomous vessel. Kavallieratos et al. (2020) used STPA
with security analysis in parallel for identification of safety and security
requirements.
Nevertheless, the previously presented methods and standards do
not seem to address properly the needs of cyber-risk assessment for
maritime assets, as explained below. ISO 27000 (ISO/IEC, 2016) sug-
gests a generic risk assessment framework, which might not be well
adjusted to the industrial systems, such as ships, as the consequences
are expressed in asset value and not in terms of safety, environmental
and other consequences metrics. IEC 62443 (IEC, 2018) is a standard
for industrial systems security, and the approach is not suitably “mar-
inised”. The NIST SP800-37 approach (NIST, 2019) focuses on the cy-
berattacks impact in terms of integrity, availability and confidentiality,
which needs however an additional step to consider the potential
safety, environmental and financial implications due to the loss of in-
tegrity, availability and confidentiality. The class societies rules for
cyber-risk assessment are more suitable for ship systems; however they
might either refer to other standards as IEC 62443 for carrying out the
risk assessment process (LR, 2019), provide generic guidelines (ABS,
2018), assess consequences in terms of integrity, availability and con-
fidentiality (BIMCO, 2018a; ClassNK, 2019; DNV GL, 2016) or lack in
description of potential attacks types which will affect the consequences
(BV, 2018).
In many of the previous research studies, such as Jones et al. (2016);
Tam and Jones (2019) and Tam and Jones (2018), the risk assessment
was implemented considering a high level system architecture, which
does not support the system cybersecurity enhancement. The risk as-
sessment using STRIDE, as in other studies (Kavallieratos et al., 2019),
can be used to identify a number of potential attack scenarios but it did
not address the safety-related consequences. The use of other ap-
proaches involving STPA (Omitola et al., 2018) and Attack Trees
(Shang et al., 2019) or both (Glomsrud and Xie, 2019) can be rather
labour intensive. It is deduced from previous STPA applications that
this method may result in an overwhelming number of hazardous sce-
narios (Bolbot et al., 2020; Bolbot et al., 2019b; Bolbot et al., 2018). In
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the authors view, such a detailed method would be beneficial to be
applied after a less labour-intensive approach is used. Other ap-
proaches, as presented by Svilicic et al. (2019a), are applied in con-
junction with ships systems penetration testing. This supports the risk
assessment process but cannot be implemented prior to the actual
system testing. Therefore, the generation of the relevant system re-
quirements cannot be supported.
In addition, none of the previous studies conducted a risk assess-
ment of an inland waterways autonomous vessel. Inland waterways
autonomous vessels operate in a different environment in comparison
to the short sea or ocean going vessels, with different systems re-
quirements and size, and they can attract the interest from different
hackers groups. For instance, it is much easier to embark an autono-
mous inland ship in comparison with ships that sail in open seas or in
short shipping routes, but of course piracy incidents frequency will also
depend on the operating area. Ships operation in canals imposes spe-
cific boundaries on the ship design, affecting the amount of transferred
cargo and consequently the loss value. Additionally, autonomous inland
waterways ships will use different communication protocols such as 4G,
whereas ocean going ships might use satellite communication with
shore. Therefore, the scenarios that can arise due to cyber-attacks and
their likelihood can be different in an autonomous inland ship than in
other types of ships.
In this respect, the aim of this study is to develop a novel method for
conducting the risk assessment for cyber-attacks for ship systems in-
cluding autonomous ships, which addresses the limitations of previous
methods/approaches. The developed novel method is subsequently
employed to conduct the cyber-attacks risk assessment for the naviga-
tion and propulsion systems of an inland waterways autonomous vessel.
The novelty of the present research includes: (a) a novel method de-
velopment for ships cyber risk assessment; (b) identification of potential
vulnerabilities, attack vectors and control barriers for ships systems
required to facilitate the method application; (c) identification of attack
scenarios arising in the propulsion and navigation systems of the in-
vestigated inland autonomous ship, and; (e) identification of the safety/
cyber security control measures/barriers for this ship.
The remaining of this article is organised as follows. The developed
method for cyber-attacks risk assessment is presented in Section 2. A
description of the investigated case study of the inland waterways
vessel is provided in Section 3. The derived results along with their
discussion are provided in Section 4. Finally, the main findings are
summarised and suggestions for future research are provided in Section
5.
2. Proposed method for the cyber risk assessment in ships
2.1. Method rationale, overview and method novelty
The Cyber Preliminary Hazard Analysis (CPHA) is selected as the
basis for the development of the novel method proposed in this study.
This method is rather similar with classical HazId (Hazard
Identification), which is widely used in maritime industry, so it can be
easily understood and used by the safety engineers in its original form
or a modified form. Furthermore, a similar approach based on CPHA
has been adopted by Bureau Veritas (BV) according to their rules (BV,
2018). In addition, this approach seems to be more aligned with the IEC
62433 standard guidelines for cyber risk assessment of industrial sys-
tems, as HazId results are suggested to be used as input to the cyber risk
assessment.
The developed method, named CYber-Risk Assessment for Marine
Systems (CYRA-MS), consists of four phases (A to D) and follows in total
ten steps, as illustrated in the flowchart depicted in Fig. 1. The method
initiates with the identification of the system components and the
mapping of the relevant connections/interactions (Step 1) as it is im-
portant first to sufficiently understand the investigated system. The
proper understanding of component functions and interactions will
support the identification of attack consequences. Subsequently, a
specific attack group is selected for the analysis (Step 2), as different
attack groups will focus on different attack scenarios. In parallel, based
on the literature review and an existing vulnerabilities database, the
existing vulnerabilities for the system components are identified (Step
3). The vulnerabilities are used to identify the potential attacks on
various system components. Based on the specific attack group goal and
vulnerabilities, the potential attacks types (Step 4) on the system
components along with the potential consequences (Step 5) of each
attack type are identified. In Step 6, an estimation for the success
likelihood of each specific attack scenario is provided based on the
following parameters: attack group goals, activity level, technological
level, connectivity level, required resources for exploiting vulner-
abilities and available control barriers. The different consequences are
ranked in terms of their severity in Step 7. In Step 8, the control mea-
sures for each hazardous scenarios are identified/proposed. The sce-
narios risk is reassessed based on the new control measures in Step 9. In
Step 10, the different safety requirements and suggestions for the
system design are summarised based on previous steps. All these 10
Steps are elaborated in detail in the following sections.
The novelty of the CYRA-MS method compared to the CPHA in-
clude: (a) the consideration of attack group goals in the analysis; (b) the
incorporation of different attack types; (c) estimating the likelihood of
the successful attacks considering the attack group goals, activity level,
technological level, connectivity level, required resources and available
control barriers; (d) expanding the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)
consequences table to allow ranking of scenarios in financial, safety and
environmental terms.
2.2. Phase A – Preparation for analysis (Steps 1–3)
The prerequisite for the CYRA-MS is the identification of: (a) the
control system elements; (b) the control elements functions and func-
tionalities; (c) the control system elements interfaces (sensors and ac-
tuators) with the physical word; (d) the controlled processes; (e) the
interfaces among the control systems; (f) the data flow in the system,
and; (g) the potential entry points into the system (physical and logical
access points) (IEC, 2018). This is implemented in Step 1 (Fig. 1), by
analysing the available system information and developing the system
physical and logical mapping (Flaus, 2019). An example of what this
information includes is provided in the results for the case study pre-
sented in Section 4.1 in Fig. 3 and Table 11.
As the attackers do not have neither the same motives nor the same
resources when attacking a ship network (Tam and Jones, 2019), the
attack scenarios assessed in Steps 4 to 7 (Fig. 1) for each attack group
will vary. In this respect, the potential attack groups (or threat groups)
are selected in Step 2 (Fig. 1). Using previous research studies (BIMCO,
2018a; Boyes and Isbell, 2017; BV, 2018; Flaus, 2019; IEC, 2011a; Tam
and Jones, 2019), the attack groups were identified and presented in
Table 1. The technological level of each attack group according to the
Bureau Veritas (BV) guidelines is also presented in Table 1.
The known vulnerabilities, the potential entry points and attack
types are identified in Step 3 (Fig. 1) by using the information provided
in the following resources: (a) previous research publications e.g.
(Flaus, 2019; Kavallieratos et al., 2019; Omitola et al., 2018; Tam and
Jones, 2018); (b) the available maritime standards (BIMCO, 2018a;
Boyes and Isbell, 2017; DNV GL, 2016; IMO, 2016a; Maritime affairs
directorate of France, 2016); (c) relevant generic standards (IEC,
2011a), and; (d) the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA) database (CISA, 2019a). A generic list of the vulnerabilities, the
potential entry points and the attack types for the various system
components, which are identified based on the existing literature and
reported cyber-attack cases, is provided in Table B.1 in Appendix B.
Whilst this list is provided in Table B.1, it is highly recommended to
keep updating this list due the evolving nature of this area, as it is
expected that new vulnerabilities and attack types will be discovered,
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which may result in new attack scenarios.
2.3. Phase B – Identifying the attack scenarios (Steps 4–5)
Based on the goals of each attack group (from Step 2) as well as the
system components vulnerabilities and attack vectors (from Step 3), the
potential attack scenarios are identified in Step 4 (Fig. 1). The identi-
fication of the potential attack scenarios can be implemented with the
assistance of Table B.1 which connects the system components with the
potential attack types.
The system components functionalities (Step 1) and the attack
group goal (Step 2) are used to derive the potential consequences of the
attack scenarios in Step 5 analysis (Fig. 1). The potential consequences
can be categorised in the following three different types: (a) safety
consequences leading to violation of the safety requirements; (b) en-
vironmental consequences leading to environmental pollution, and; (c)
financial consequences. The identification of potential safety and fi-
nancial inadvertent effects is enhanced through the review of accidents
lists for ships according to IMO list of incidents accidents (IMO, 2008),
which are provided in Table 2. The potential environmental con-
sequences according to MARPOL (IMO, 2016b) can be of two major
types: air pollution or sea pollution. The financial consequences in-
clude: (a) loss or damage of ships systems; (b) loss or damage to ship
cargo, and; (c) disruptions in ship operation and associated logistic
chain leading to financial loss; and (d) potential legislation effects
leading to financial losses. Steps 4 and 5 are not completely in-
dependent as the attack group goal affects both the targeted inadvertent
scenario and the employed attack scenario.
2.4. Phase C – Scenarios ranking (Steps 6–7)
In Steps 6 and 7, the scenarios are ranked according to their ex-
pected likelihood and severity. However, as the cybersecurity issues are
relatively new in the maritime industry, to the best of authors’ knowl-
edge, there are no reliable statistics for different attack scenarios. For
this reason, a new methodological approach is suggested below.
The likelihood of each scenario (combination of attack and con-
sequences) is affected by: (a) the level of exposure of each system (EL)
to attacks due to the connectivity level (CL1) and the complexity level
(CL2) (BV, 2018); (b) the interest of the specific attack group in an
attack scenario (IL), (Tam and Jones, 2019); (c) the attacker techno-
logical level (TL) (BV, 2018); (d) each attack group activity level (AL)
(EBIOS, 2019); (e) the ease of exploitation (EE) (Tam and Jones, 2019)
and; (f) the vulnerability level due to the absence/presence as well as
the effectiveness of mitigating and preventative barriers for each sce-
nario (VL).
Therefore, the frequency (F) of the successful attack (events per
ship-year) can be estimated according to the following equation:
Fig. 1. CYRA-MS method flowchart.
Table 1
Identified attack groups.
a/a Attack group Goal Technological level (TL)
1 Generic hackers Spreading their malware around the web network to get ransom 1
2 Amateur hackers Improving and training their hackings skills 2
3 Ethical hackers Finding vulnerabilities in system with the goal to improve the system 2
4 Former malicious employees Taking revenge from the ship operating company 3
5 Malicious external providers Stealing the machinery/condition based data 3
6 Activists (Hacktivists) Delay or cancel the introduction of autonomous vessels or of specific vessels 3
7 Criminal hackers Stealing the ship, her cargo, components or seeking for a monetary reward 4
8 Competitors Stealing valuable data or sabotaging and damaging the ship 4
9 Terrorists Damaging the ship and/or causing fatalities 4
10 Criminals Transferring illegal cargo or people 4
11 States Damaging or taking control over the ship Developing non access/zero GPS zones 5
Table 2
Ship accident types (IMO, 2008).
Collision [A-1]
Grounding [A-2]
Contact [A-3]
Fire or explosion [A-4]
Hull failure/failure of watertight doors/ports etc. not caused by [A-1 – A-4], [A-5]
Machinery damage/damage to ship equipment [A-6]
Capsizing, listing or foundering not caused by [A-1 – A-6], [A-7]
Crew injury or death [A-8]
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= =− − − − − − −F 10 10 10 10 10 10 10FI AL EL IL TL EE VL6 6 5 ( 5)/2 ( 5)/2 5 6 (1)
The consecutive terms in the right hand side part of Eq. (1) denote,
respectively: the number of the attack attempts frequency −(10 )AL 6 [at-
tack per ship-year] ( ∈ −AL {1 7}), the probability of the attack success
due to the system exposure −(10 )EL 5 [-] ( ∈ −EL {1 5}, the probability of
the attack group interest in a specific scenario −(10 )IL( 5)/2 [-]
∈ −IL( {1 5}), the probability of the attack success due to the attack
group technological level −(10 TL( 5)/2) [-] ( ∈ −TL {1 5}), the amount of
resources required for a successful attack −(10 )EE 5 [-] ( ∈ −EE {1 5}),
and the probability of the attack success due to the presence of pro-
tective barriers −(10 )VL 6 [-] ( ∈ −VL {1 6}). Practically, Eq. (1) considers
that if a cyber-attack attempt is implemented (depicted by AL), its
success will be dependent on all the other parameters values (EL, IL, TL,
EE, VL).
The assumptions behind the Eq. (1) along with their justification are
provided below in bullet points:
• The base of 10 has been used in similar way with Level Of Protection
Analysis (LOPA) approach (British Standards Institution (BSI),
2004) and to allow the estimation of raking according to FSA.
• The probabilities of the attack group interest and technological level
lie in the range from 0.01 to 1. This assumption can be viewed as
aligned with the ANSSI 2013 approach (Flaus, 2019), where the
attacker technological level is divided by 2.
• For estimating the system exposure level, ease of exploitation and
vulnerability level, it is assumed that their probability values are in
the range between 0.0001 and 1. In this respect, the considered
assumption for the exposure level is aligned with the relevant pro-
cedures in the ANSSI 2013 approach (Flaus, 2019).
• For the vulnerability level, the underlying assumption is that each
protective barrier can mitigate the 90% of relevant hazardous con-
ditions. This is a rather conservative assumption with regard to the
effectiveness of the mitigation barriers (British Standards Institution
(BSI), 2004). This assumption can be overcome if appropriate evi-
dence for the barrier effectiveness is provided. For instance, higher
effectiveness can be assigned to protective barriers not based on
digital technologies (Cormier and Ng, 2020).
The Frequency Index (FI) is calculated according to the following
equation, which was derived by summing the exponents of Eq. (1),
rounding up the calculated value (to avoid non-integer values) and
considering that the FI minimum value is equal to 1:
= ⎡
⎣
⎛
⎝
+ − + − + − + −
+ − ⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦
FI IL TLmax round AL (EL 5) 5
2
5
2
(EE 5)
(VL 6) , 1
(2)
The activity level (AL) corresponds to the number of an attack at-
tempts by a specific group. It is proposed to determine the AL by using a
ranking developed based on Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) Frequency
Index (IMO, 2018), since the proposed method is developed for marine
systems applications. The categorisation and the respective frequency
ranges considered in this study are provided in Table 3. For determining
the level of exposure for each system, the method proposed in (BV,
2018) is employed. Thus, each system exposure level is estimated basedTa
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Table 4
Determination of exposure level (EL) (BV, 2018).
Exposure level Connectivity level (CL1)
1 2 3 4 5
Complexity level (CL2) 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 4 4 5
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on the system complexity and connectivity levels as illustrated in Tables
4–6. The attacker interest level is determined by adopting and enhan-
cing the relevant ranking of MaCRA approach (Tam and Jones, 2019) as
in Table 7. Each attacker technological level is provided in Table 1 by
using BV guidelines (BV, 2018). The ease of exploitation is ranked ac-
cording to Table 7. The ranking for the mitigation effectiveness or
preventative barriers (it is alternatively referred as the vulnerability
level) is implemented according to Table 7 based on our previous re-
search work in (Bolbot et al., 2019a).
For estimating the vulnerability level ranking, the following barriers
types are considered: (a) the presence of redundant components or
communication lines implementing the same functionality with the one
under attack; (b) the available safety or system reconfiguration func-
tions; (c) the presence of humans operators constantly monitoring the
system or potential rectification actions; (d) the presence of antivirus
software on the considered components; (e) the presence of additional
firewalls; (f) the incorporation of intrusion detection systems; (g) the
use of enhanced security software architecture on the considered
system components, and; (h) the level of access granted to the per-
sonnel to specific systems/functions. A detailed list of control barriers is
provided in Table B.1.
The frequency and the severity of each attack scenario are ranked
using the FSA ranking tables as proposed by (IMO, 2018), and pre-
sented in Tables 3 and 8. The severity ranking is implemented based on
the consequences, where the most severe consequence among different
types is selected for the risk estimation. The financial cost from the ship
operation disruption is estimated based on the equivalence of a human
life loss (Net cost of averting a fatality value from FSA), which is taken
as $3m for 1998 according to (IMO, 2018) whilst considering the
average inflation rate from 1998 to 2020 (2.29%). The consequences to
the air pollution are derived according to the provided guidelines for
cyber risk assessment by BV (2018). For harmonising the proposed
methodology results with the pertinent IMO FSA guidelines, the attack
risk is evaluated using the risk matrix presented in Table 9. In this risk
matrix, higher severity but lower frequency accidents are given higher
priority in comparison to lower severity but higher frequency accidents.
2.5. Phase D – System enhancement and requirements generation (Steps
8–10)
Based on the previous step results (Steps 1–7), it assessed whether
the risk for each investigated scenario is within the acceptable region.
For the investigated scenarios with not acceptable risk, the appropriate
preventive and mitigating control barriers are identified and proposed
in Step 8. The scenarios risk can be reduced by (ISO/IEC, 2016): (a)
avoiding risk, e.g. changing the operational area; (b) removing the risk
source, e.g. reducing the connectivity level; (c) influencing the like-
lihood, e.g. adding control barriers; (d) mitigating the consequences,
e.g. enhancing the response and recovery after attack, and; (e) sharing
risk through insurance.
Subsequently, the scenarios risk is reassessed considering the
modified system architecture that includes the proposed control bar-
riers. If the risk is acceptable, the process terminates. Otherwise, new
barriers or architecture/functions are proposed. Based on this analysis
results, it is reviewed whether different control barriers are repeated
several times. Based on the frequency of appearance of different control
barriers, the relevant safety recommendations at this ship design stage
are derived.
3. Case study description
The proposed methodology was applied to estimate the cyber risk of
a fully autonomous version of the Pallet Shuttle Barge (PSB) (Blue Lines
Logistics, 2015) operating in inland waterways in the unmanned mode.
This vessel is the one of the two use-cases of the AUTOSHIP project
(AUTOSHIP, 2019). The main ship particulars are provided in Table 10.
It must be noted that this study considers a theoretical use case of a
fully autonomous PSB and not the actual demontrator of the AUTOSHIP
project. Moreover, this study focuses on this vessel navigation and
propulsion systems, as they are considered the most vulnerable to
cyber-attacks (BIMCO, 2018b). The systems and equipment as well as
their relevant interconnections and interactions, which are used for the
vessel navigation and the propulsion in the autonomous mode, are
provided in the schematic shown in Fig. 2. This schematic was devel-
oped based on the information reported in (Boyes and Isbell, 2017;
Höyhtyä et al., 2017; Maritime affairs directorate of France, 2016;
Schmidt et al., 2015; Stefani, 2013) and available drawings for similar
ships. Further information is provided in Section 4.1.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Phase A – Preparation for analysis (Steps 1–3)
The results of the developed methodology (Step 1) include the in-
vestigated autonomous ship systems control elements, their function-
alities, their interactions with other control elements, the potential
entry points for cyber-attacks and the relevant network zones identifi-
cation. The derived results from Step 1 are presented in Fig. 3 and
Table 5
Connectivity level ranking (CL1) (BV, 2018).
Connectivity Level Description Ranking (CL)
Level 1 Isolated system with no connectivity 1
Level 2 The system is connected to another system through secure (encrypted) communication and the communication is one-way from the
considered system to another system.
2
Level 3 Applicable to a system with Connectivity Level 2, which employs wireless connection. The system is one-way interconnected to another
system using unencrypted communication protocols. The communication is both ways between the systems using secure communication
protocols.
3
Level 4 The system is connected to another system using distant link but using secure communication protocols and private network. The system is
connected to another system using public network but employing protective device between the two systems.
4
Level 5 The system is exposed to public network e.g. external supplier can access the system network. 5
Table 6
Complexity level (CL2) ranking (BV, 2018).
Complexity Level Definition Ranking
Level 1 Systems with workstations and light servers; restoration of these systems is easily applied 1
Level 2 Systems with host authentication servers, database servers, supervision or programming workstations 2
Level 3 Unmanned systems, swarm connections, or systems dependent on high density of system exchange 3
V. Bolbot, et al. Safety Science 131 (2020) 104908
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Table 11. As it can be observed in Fig. 3, the investigated autonomous
PSB has four major network zones. Zone 1 depicts the shore control
centre, Zone 2 depicts the high level controllers, whereas Zone 3 and
Zone 4 depict the engine automation and navigation systems.
Typically terrorist groups mainly target a ship accident occurrence
(Tam and Jones, 2019). Thus, the focus of the present case study will
shift towards identifying attacks and scenarios, which may be of in-
terest by terrorists (Step 2).
The vulnerabilities list, potential entry points and attack types (step
3) have been provided in Appendix B.
4.2. Phase B & C – Identifying and ranking the attack scenarios (Steps 4–7)
In total 52 different attack scenarios were identified in Steps 4 and 5
by focusing on each system component. An example is provided in
Table 11. The calculated risk index of these scenarios are shown in
Fig. 4. The components functionality, potential vulnerabilities and goal
of the attacker group were considered for determining the attack con-
sequences. However, as mentioned in Section 2.2, the identified sce-
narios need to be updated based on the new identified vulnerabilities to
remain up-to-date.
For the investigated vessel RI calculation the following assumptions
were considered:
• The Activity Level (AL) of the terrorists was selected as reasonably
probable (5). According to EBIOS (EBIOS, 2019), it could be ranked
as low, however it is expected that the autonomous vessel will at-
tract greater attention than the usual means of transport.
• The Technological Level (TL) was set to 4, following the guidelines
provided in (BV, 2018).
• The interest level (IL) for scenarios with major safety consequences
was set to 5, as terrorists are expected to cause as much damage in
terms of human lives as possible. Less significant safety con-
sequences correspond to lower IL values.
• For the Ease of Exploitation (EE) ranking, the systems with direct
access to public network (Shore Control Centre, Connectivity
Manager, Ship Control Station, VHF, AIS, GPS) were considered the
easiest ones to be exploited. The systems in zones 2 and 4 were
considered the more difficult systems to be attacked. The systems in
zone 3 were considered the least accessible systems, as they hold a
lower position in the control system architecture (Flaus, 2019).
• Since the ship systems are connected to the public network (4G and
internet through shore control centre) (CL1 = 5) and it is a system
with high complexity level (CL2 = 3), the components Exposure
Level (EL) was set to 5.
• Initially, no protective measures were considered, therefore the
Vulnerability Level (VL) was set to 5.
Out of the 52 identified scenarios, 4 were categorised as critical, 41
were found to be in a tolerable region and only 7 of them were initially
characterised as of negligible importance. After the incorporation of the
available and new safety/cyber security/security barriers, criticalsce-
narios were not found, 14 scenarios were considered as tolerable and
the rest (38) scenarios were classified as negligible. The identified
scenarios by the CYRA-MS with RI greater or equal with 8 are provided
in Table 12. These scenarios are related to the access to the ship control
station and the shore control station, as they may result in major con-
sequences. Other top critical scenarios were related either to the GPS
signal related attacks, as it is a scenario that can be easily exploited, or a
malware installation on the collision avoidance system and the situa-
tion awareness system, as it is a scenario with potential major con-
sequences.
4.3. Phase D – System enhancement and requirements generation (Steps
8–10)
The enhanced system logical structure is also presented in Fig. 3. For
the system cyber risk reduction, it was considered that the vessel
communication is implemented via a secure network with the shore
control centre, whilst all the communications with the public network
at the shore control centre and in other zones are cut, setting the EL to
4. In addition, it was considered that firewalls/redundant commu-
nication lines applying different technologies are installed between the
different network zones. A safety system and intrusion detection sys-
tems monitoring for system safety and suspicious controllers behaviour
in zone 2 are proposed as a means for the verification of the ship sys-
tems control actions. It is also proposed that these monitoring systems
implement functions redundant to some of the functions of autonomous
Table 9
The risk matrix (IMO, 2018).
Risk Index (RI)
FI Frequency Severity (SI)
1 2 3 4
Minor Significant Severe Catastrophic
7 Frequent (H) 8 (H) 9 (H) 10 (H) 11
6 (M) 7 (H) 8 (H) 9 (H) 10
5 Reasonably
probable
(M) 6 (M) 7 (H) 8 (H) 9
4 (M) 5 (M) 6 (M) 7 (H) 8
3 Remote (L) 4 (M) 5 (M) 6 (M) 7
2 (L) 3 (L) 4 (M) 5 (M) 6
1 Extremely remote (L) 2 (L) 3 (L) 4 (M) 5
High (H) = Intolerable
Risk
Medium
(M) = Tolerable Risk
Low (L) = Negligible Risk
Table 10
Investigated ship particulars.
Length 50 m
Breadth 6.6 m
Maximum Draught 2.2 m
Air draught 5.6 m
Maximum cargo load 300 tonnes
Maximum speed 8.1 knots
Installed engines power 300 HP
Propulsion type Diesel-mechanical with azimuth propulsion aft and
bow thruster
Table 11
Investigated PSB selected components functionalities description.
Component Functionalities Data sent Data received
Shore control centre Monitoring of physical processes
Navigation control
Control over the ship in emergency/manoeuvring operating modes
Implementation of software updates
Control information for navigation
Selected route
Ship operating mode
Control status of equipment (on/off)
New software
Equipment health status
Equipment status (on/off, loads, position)
Images from cameras
Vessel position
VHF data
Traffic in the area
Radar, ECDIS information
V. Bolbot, et al. Safety Science 131 (2020) 104908
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ship controller, in case of a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Sanity checks
and filter application for the GPS signals measurements, as well as
addition of anti-interference antennas are also proposed to be added in
the investigated systems configuration to reduce the impact of the GPS
signal loss. For some of the critical components (autonomous ship
controller, intrusion detection system and navigation system), it is
suggested that they operate in a kernel function, so that no software is
installed without permission. It is also suggested that the situation
awareness system carries out continuous sanity checks of the received
measurements (speed, GPS, etc.). For the specific vessel, it is also sug-
gested to install Power Take-In Power Take-Out technologies and in-
terconnect them with the Diesel Generator sets, thus ensuring the
propulsion power availability in case of failures in the Diesel Generator
set or the ship main engine. Additional control measures are also in-
dicated in Fig. 3.
Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of the fully autonomous PSB systems and interactions.
Fig. 3. Fully autonomous PSB systems logical modelling for baseline and enhanced system design.
V. Bolbot, et al. Safety Science 131 (2020) 104908
9
4.4. Discussion on the proposed method and results
Based on the CYRA-MS application, it can be stated that the method
allowed for the incorporation to the cyber risk analysis of different
consequences types including safety, environmental and financial.
Furthermore, the method included more potential attack scenarios than
the STRIDE (Kavallieratos et al., 2019) or the MaCRA (Tam and Jones,
2019) methods. The method has been aligned with the FSA risk matrix
facilitating the qualification of the new system and its approval by
classification societies or derivation of prescriptive requirements for
similar type of vessels at national level. As it has been also demon-
strated in Section 4.3, the method supported the identification of var-
ious control measures enhancing the design. The provision of specific
rules and guidelines for the scenarios identification and ranking is also
expected to facilitate the cyber risk assessment process and improve its
repeatability. This can be argued as the identification is implemented
based on a formalised system representation and the ranking is im-
plemented based on the available resources and guidelines bypassing
the lack of relevant statistical data.
The method is a way to go forward with respect to ranking, when no
or scarce statistical data is available. The method results could be va-
lidated when the relevant accident statistical data is available, but this
data might take long to be accumulated. The method potentially could
be enhanced by analysing the incidents data and estimating the
leading/lagging safety and cybersecurity indicators, which could be
another way to validate and update the method. Still, it is expected that
the availability of accident data would constitute a better ground for
making cyber risk assessments. Improvement of the obtained results
fidelity can be achieved by the involvement of an experts’ team.
Continuous update of the list in Appendix B is also important for the
method application and accuracy.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the identified scenarios
ranking can be misleading as hackers may intentionally target at im-
plementing the scenarios with low ranking. This would be feasible,
provided that hackers have access to the relevant risk assessment data.
For this reason, only the critical scenarios are provided herein. In ad-
dition, the scenarios ranking considers a number of parameters, pri-
marily the interest level, which depict the scenarios that would be of
interest for each attack group. Hence, scenarios with low ranking will
hardly attract the attention of specific attack groups.
In addition, it could also be argued that the derived results are
generic and applicable to all types of autonomous vessels. However, as
Tam and Jones (2018) demonstrated, the results of risk assessment
differentiate for different vessel types. An example scenario is obtaining
physical access to the ship control centre. It is much easier to get
physical access to an inland waterways vessel due to its operation in
canals rather than to the short sea going or oceangoing vessels. Fur-
thermore, the ranking differentiates based on the different control
measures/barriers availability, connectivity levels and architecture, as
well as system complexity. Different types of control measures/barriers
can be implemented to the same vessel to ensure its safety. The im-
plementation of risk assessment is also important for obtaining the
approval from the classification societies.
One deficiency of the method is that it does not consider complex
attacks on the protective measures. For instance, an first attack could
compromise a protective measure, so that the primary attack (identified
using CYRA-MS) follows. Yet, this scenario would require much more
resources. However, these scenarios can be tackled by additional ana-
lysis employing much more detailed methods. Similarly, the proposed
method considers simple safety scenarios. However, more complex
safety scenarios potentially could be identified using other methods,
after this analysis is implemented for the initially identified critical
components. The use of the FSA matrix only provided a rough esti-
mation of the risk metrics considering simpler scenarios. The potential
consequences are not considered in great detail, which can also lead to
wrong rankings. Finally, the drawback of the method is the independent
consideration of the different attack groups. This practically means that
additional system analysis is required for each attack group. Yet,
grouping and facilitating the implementation of CYRA-MS method is a
suggestion for future research.
5. Conclusions
This study aimed at developing a novel cyber risk assessment
method for ship systems. The method is based on the identification of
potential attack groups, the system components vulnerabilities, attack
scenarios and ranking based on specific guidelines. The method was
applied for identifying and ranking the cyber-attacks scenarios, which
can be implemented by terrorists, in the case of the navigation and
propulsion control systems of a fully autonomous inland ship.
The main findings of this study are the following:
• The proposed method allowed for estimating the risk metric for a
number of attack scenarios for the investigated autonomous vessel
by incorporating pertinent parameters and guided the safety en-
hancement of the investigated vessel system design.
• Attacks on the shore control centre and the ship control station,
targeting at obtaining privileged access, have the highest potential
safety implications and thus can be of high interest to terrorists for
the specific vessel. Malware installation on the collision avoidance
system and the situation awareness system have also significant
safety implications as well.
• The investigated vessel system safety can be enhanced by adding
firewalls on the conduits between the different control zones, in-
creased redundancy in the communication between control zones as
well as installing intrusion detection systems in different zones and
eliminating internet communication links.
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In conclusion, the proposed method can constitute a valuable tool
for conducting risk assessments and the design enhancement of au-
tonomous and smart vessels facilitating the approval of a new ship
design. Future research initiatives could focus on further enhancement
of the presented method, on enhancing the ranking accuracy, on ag-
gregating the different risk scores for different attack groups, sup-
porting the cost-benefit analysis and on a more detailed cyber-security
analysis.
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Appendix A. Abbreviation and nomenclature list
See Tables A.1 and A.2.
Appendix B. Vulnerabilities, entry points and attack types on system components
A list of vulnerabilities, potential entry points and attack types for various ship components is provided in Table B.1.
Table A.1
Abbreviation list.
AIS Automatic Identification System
BV Bureau Veritas
CISA Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
CPHA Cyber Preliminary Hazard Analysis
CYRA-MS CYber-Risk Assessment for Marine Systems
DoS Denial of Service
ECDIS Electronic Chart Display Information System
FSA Formal Safety Assessment
GMDSS Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
GPS Global Positioning System
HazId Hazard Identification
IMO International Maritime Organisation
IT Information Technologies
LADAR Laser Detection And Ranging
LiDAR Light Detection And Ranging
MaCRA Maritime Cyber-Risk Assessment
OT Operational Technologies
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
PSB Pallet Shuttle Barge
RADAR RAdio Detection And Ranging
SCADA System Control And Data Acquisition
STRIDE Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of
Service and Elevation of Privilege
VDR Voyage Data Recorder
VHF Very High Frequency
Table A.2
Nomenclature list.
AL Activity level [attack per ship-year]
CL1 Connectivity level [-]
CL2 Connectivity level [-]
EE Ease of exploitation [-]
EL Exposure level [-]
F Frequency [per ship-year]
FI Frequency index [-]
H High [-]
IL Interest level [-]
L Low [-]
M Medium [-]
RI Risk Index [-]
S Severity [fatalities]
SI Severity index [-]
TL Technological level [-]
VL Vulnerability level [-]
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